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Introduction
OVER THE YEARS, Attorneys General of the United States have
professed the view that their office “has a duty to defend and enforce
both the Acts of Congress and the Constitution.”1 Consequently, as a
general rule, Attorneys General have consistently affirmed that it is
not the place of their office to declare statutes unconstitutional. When
faced with a legislative act that they believe violates the Constitution,
the Attorney General “can best discharge the responsibilities of his
office by defending and enforcing the Act of Congress.”2 The reason
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1. 4A Op. O.L.C. 55, 55 (1980).
2. Id.; see also 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 158, 160 (1942) (“[T]here are grave objections to the
rendition of opinions by the Attorney General upon requests from the heads of the Fed-
eral departments and independent establishments concerning the constitutionality of laws
they have been appointed to administer.”); 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 11, 14 (1937) (“[T]here
rarely can be proper occasion for the rendition of an opinion by the Attorney General
upon [an act’s] constitutionality after it has become law.”); 38 Op. Att’y Gen. 252, 253
(1935) (“[I]t does not lie within the province of a ministerial officer to question the valid-
ity of a statute which, in so far as he is concerned, merely imposes upon him a proper duty
and has no bearing upon his constitutional rights.”); 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 475, 476 (1919)
(“Ordinarily, I would be content to say that it is not within the province of the Attorney
General to declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional . . . .”). But see 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462,
469 (1860) (“Every law is to be carried out so far forth as is consistent with the Constitu-
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for this position is inherent in our system of checks and balances and
the constitutional separation of powers.3 Whereas “[i]t is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is,”4 the executive branch must “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”5 Allowing the Attorney General—a member of the execu-
tive branch—to pass on the constitutionality of an act of Congress
“could jeopardize the equilibrium established within our constitu-
tional system.”6 The delicate balance created by the separation of pow-
ers between the three branches of government is imperiled when one
branch assumes the province of another.
Despite this seemingly explicit and unambiguous division of pow-
ers, there have been numerous occasions in which the Attorney Gen-
eral, acting either on his own behalf or upon the instruction of the
President, has refused to defend an act of Congress. Most recently,
Attorney General Eric Holder announced to Congress that President
Barack Obama had concluded that Section 3 of the Defense of Mar-
riage Act7 was unconstitutional and that the Justice Department would
not defend that section’s constitutionality in any pending or subse-
quently filed case.8 Predictably, this announcement was met with par-
tisan uproar.9 Similarly, when the Reagan Administration refused to
defend aspects of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting Act against
a constitutional challenge in League of Women Voters v. FCC,10 the deci-
sion was lambasted as mere politics and an executive usurpation of
tion, and no further. The sound part of it must be executed, and the vicious portion of it
suffered to drop.”).
3. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers . . . [are] vested in a Congress of
the United States . . . .”); Id. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power [is] vested in a President of
the United States of America.“); id. art. III, § 1 (”The judicial Power of the United States,
[is] vested in one supreme Court . . . .“).
4. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
6. 4A Op. O.L.C. 55, 56 (1980).
7. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
8. Letter from U.S. Att’y Gen. Eric Holder to U.S. House Speaker John Boehner
(Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.
html.
9. See, e.g., Defending Marriage: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of Rep. Trent Franks) (“When the
President unilaterally declares a duly enacted law unconstitutional, he cuts Congress and
the American people out of the lawmaking process, and such heavy-handed Presidential
actions undermine the separation of powers and the principle that America is a constitu-
tional Republic predicated on the rule of law.”).
10. 489 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
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legislative power.11 The main difference in these two situations is the
party affiliation of the vocal critics.
Many scholarly attempts to discuss the Attorney General’s role in
deciding whether to enforce or defend a particular statute have been
prepared by former Attorneys or Solicitors General themselves.12
Much of that discussion has focused on the unique role of the Solici-
tor General in the modern era.13 Scholarly focus on the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s office is understandable, because most contemporary
commentary mistakenly claims that executive refusal to defend stat-
utes is a recent development.14 To the contrary, Attorneys General
have been declining to defend the government going at least as far
back as Marbury v. Madison.15
11. See, e.g., Note, Executive Discretion and the Constitutional Defense of Statutes, 92 YALE
L.J. 970, 976–81 (1983).
12. This includes, more generally, scholarly attempts to discuss the interplay between
the Attorney General’s (and later the Solicitor General’s) role as both chief litigator for
the United States and political official. See, e.g., Griffin Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal
Government’s Chief Lawyer and Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049
(1978) (Attorney General to President Carter); Drew S. Days III, In Search of the Solicitor
General’s Clients: A Drama with Many Characters, 83 KY. L.J. 485 (1994) (Solicitor General to
President Clinton); Walter Dellinger, Legal Opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel to the Hon.
Abner J. Mikva, 48 ARK. L. REV. 313 (1995) (Solicitor General to President Clinton); Erwin
Griswold, The Office of the Solicitor General–Representing the Interests of the United States before the
Supreme Court, 35 MO. L. REV. 527 (1969) (Solicitor General to Presidents Lyndon Johnson
and Richard Nixon); Simon E. Sobeloff, Attorney for the Government: The Work of the Solicitor
General’s Office, 41 A.B.A. J. 229 (1955) (Solicitor General to President Eisenhower, discuss-
ing Solicitor Generals’ refusal to appeal cases to the Supreme Court); Seth Waxman, De-
fending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073 (2001) (Solicitor General to President Clinton). Of
course, the seminal work on the history of the Attorney General remains HOMER CUMMINGS
& CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE (1937).
13. See generally supra note 12. Created along with the Justice Department in 1870, the
Solicitor General bears the responsibility, under the supervision of the Attorney General,
to “attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2006). The Solicitor General is also responsible for “[c]onducting
. . . all Supreme Court cases,” 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(a) (2010), and “[d]etermining whether, and
to what extent, appeals will be taken by the Government to all appellate courts.” Id.
§ 0.20(b). The Solicitor General is the only person in the executive branch statutorily re-
quired to be “learned in the law.” 28 U.S.C. § 505 (2006). When the office was originally
created, the Attorney General was required to be “a meet person, learned in the law.” An
Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92, 92 (1789).
The requirement was extended to the Solicitor General with the creation of the Justice
Department, and the office of the Solicitor General, in 1870. An Act to Establish the De-
partment of Justice, ch. 142, § 1, 16 Stat. 162, 162 (1870).
14. See, e.g., Arthur Miller & Jeffrey Bowman, Presidential Attacks on the Constitutionality
of Federal Statutes: A New Separation of Powers Problem, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 51, 51 (1979) (describ-
ing the practice as “newly emergent”).
15. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). In Marbury, Attorney General Levi Lincoln, while
nominally counsel for Secretary of State James Madison, refused to appear and only sub-
mitted written responses to questions of the Court when subpoenaed. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1
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More significantly, in Ex Parte McCardle,16 Attorney General
Henry Stanbery refused to defend the Reconstruction Acts of 1867 on
the grounds that he found them unconstitutional.17 Stanbery in-
structed the War Department to engage other counsel and the De-
partment employed two sitting senators, Lyman Trumbull of Illinois
and Matthew Carpenter of Wisconsin. This marked the first time in
United States history that an act of Congress was actively represented
by Congress itself, rather than by a member of the executive branch.
The case itself became more famous for its outcome than for the
counsel that represented the parties.18 Nevertheless, McCardle
presents an oft-overlooked first instance of public debate over an At-
torney General’s refusal to appear in defense of a statute on the
grounds that he believed the it to be unconstitutional. Contemporary
discussion of Stanbery’s decision, both in the newspapers and in Con-
gress, closely resembled the discussion that is had in similar situations
today. This evidences both the timelessness of the issues raised by
these executive decisions, as well as the lack of progress made toward
resolving them over the past 140 years.
The goal of this Article is to demonstrate that the Attorney Gen-
eral’s practice of refusing to defend statutes he views as unconstitu-
tional is long-standing. Neither this phenomenon nor the debate
surrounding it is “newly emergent,” as is often asserted.19 Rather, al-
though commentators and congressmen frequently profess hypocriti-
cal surprise that the other side would dare do such a thing, the exercise
of executive discretion in appearing on behalf of the government has
been present since the earliest days of the republic. This Article will
paint a historical picture of the executive branch’s selective refusal to
defend the United States in federal courts, and will offer some conclu-
sions on the propriety of that practice. Part I will provide a historical
Cranch) at 143 (“Mr. Lincoln, attorney general, having been summoned, and now called,
objected to answering. He requested that the questions might be put in writing, and that
he might afterwards have time to determine whether he would answer.”).
16. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
17. 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RE-
CONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1868–88, at 436 (1971).
18. Before the Court announced a result, Congress legislatively stripped the Court of
its jurisdiction over the case. See An Act to Amend an Act entitled “An Act to Amend the
Judiciary Act, passed twenty-fourth of September, seventeen hundred and eighty-nine,” ch.
34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44, 44 (1868) (repealing the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 “as authorizes an
appeal from the judgment of the circuit court to the Supreme Court of the United States,
or the exercise of any such jurisdiction by said Supreme Court on appeals which have been
. . . taken”). For further discussion on the counsel that represented the parties in McCardle,
see infra Part II.B.3.
19. See, e.g., MILLER & BOWMAN, supra note 14, at 51.
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sketch of the Attorney General’s role in defending the United States
in litigation. It will also lay out the conventional doctrine for when it is
traditionally appropriate for the Attorney General to decline to de-
fend. Part II will explore several of the earliest examples of refusals to
defend, with a discussion of Marbury v. Madison and United States v.
Hudson & Goodwin,20 with particular focus on what appears to be the
first real example of an Attorney General refusing to defend an other-
wise defensible statute, Ex Parte McCardle. Part III will discuss some of
the questions raised by the decisions of the Attorneys General in the
cases discussed and attempt to identify some of the key lessons that
can be drawn from those episodes.
I. Background
A. A Brief History of the Attorney General’s Jurisdiction
The position of Attorney General was created by the Judiciary Act
of 1789,21 which provided for the appointment of a “meet person
learned in the law, to act as attorney-general for the United States.”22
The Judiciary Act required the Attorney General both to “prosecute
and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States
shall be concerned,” as well as to “give his advice and opinion upon
questions of law when required by the President of the United States,
or when required by the heads of any of the departments.”23 The Judi-
ciary Act also provided for the appointment of “an attorney for the
United States” in every district, who would represent the United States
in the lower courts.24 From the outset, then, the Attorney General has
had two main responsibilities: to provide legal opinions to the Presi-
dent and to appear before the Supreme Court on behalf of the
United States.
Initially, the Attorney General was a part-time, almost contract,
position. He received a salary, but was given neither an office nor any
funds with which to hire a staff or cover any expenses.25 Indeed, he
was expected to continue the private practice of law.26 The assump-
tion seems to have been that he would be grateful for the post, as it
20. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
21. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73
(1789).
22. Id. § 35.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. LUTHER HUSTON, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 9 (1967).
26. Id.
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would boost his prestige with his private clients.27 There seemed to be
no concern over any potential conflicts of interest.
Demands were first made for the creation of a law department as
far back as the Jackson Administration. President Polk, in 1845, and
President Pierce, in 1854, made similar proposals.28 One of the pri-
mary arguments for creating a law department was to remedy the hap-
hazard assignment of legal functions delegated by Congress to various
departments, which often left the Attorney General’s role ambiguous.
For example, under the Judiciary Act, the Attorney General had no
authority over the attorneys for the United States in the various dis-
tricts.29 Instead, the Agent of the Treasury, who was not a lawyer, was
responsible for supervising those attorneys in litigation to recover
money owed to the federal government.30 The Agent of the Treasury
in fact asked the Attorney General for legal opinions, although the
Agent remained subordinate to the Secretary of the Treasury.31 It was
not until 1870 that a law department was finally created, with the es-
tablishment of the Department of Justice, which placed many of the
government’s attorneys under the Attorney General’s direct control
and clarified the relationship between the various cabinet officials.32
Throughout the development of the Attorney General’s office,
though, and no matter the scope of that office’s jurisdiction, the core
functions of the Attorney General remain the same to this day as they
were in 1789. The Attorney General is still responsible for providing
the President with legal opinions and, while the practical elements of
this role were transferred to the Solicitor General in 1870, the Attor-
ney General is still responsible for supervising the representation of
the United States government before the Supreme Court.33 In the lat-
ter function, the Attorney General has, on many occasions, refused to
argue the government’s case. The reasons for, and results of, those
refusals are numerous and will be discussed below.
27. Id. The first Attorney General to quit private practice and devote himself full time
to the position was Caleb Cushing in 1853. Id. at 11.
28. For an overview of the various proposals, see id. at 12–15.
29. DANIEL J. MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE 6–7 (1980).
30. Id. at 7.
31. CUMMINGS & MACFARLAND, supra note 12, at 82–83. This practice was ended by
Attorney General William Wirt in 1817. Id.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 201–11.
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 519 (2006).
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B. The Duty to Defend and Conventional Exceptions
It is almost universally accepted that there are some situations in
which it is appropriate for the executive to refuse to enforce or de-
fend an act of Congress.34 The concept goes back at least as far as
James Wilson’s statement to the Pennsylvania convention on the adop-
tion of the federal Constitution, where Wilson observed:
[I]t is possible that the legislature . . . may transgress the bounds
assigned to it [by the Constitution], and an act may pass, in the
usual mode, notwithstanding that transgression; but when it comes
to be discussed before the judges,—when they consider its princi-
ples, and find it to be incompatible with the superior power of the
Constitution,—it is their duty to pronounce it void . . . . In the same
manner, the President of the United States could shield himself,
and refuse to carry into effect an act that violates the Constitution.35
More recently, the other branches of the government have reaf-
firmed this basic concept. In 1979, Congress adopted a statute requir-
ing that the Attorney General notify Congress any time he refuses to
enforce or defend a law, thus tacitly approving of the practice.36 Simi-
larly, though the Supreme Court has consistently held that its own
power to invalidate an act of Congress as unconstitutional is “one of
great delicacy, and only to be performed where the repugnancy is
clear, and the conflict irreconcilable,”37 the Court has nonetheless de-
clared that it might be appropriate for the President to “disregard
34. This Article will focus specifically on the decision of the executive not to defend
an act of Congress. However, much of the commentary on the subject has focused on a
president’s refusal to enforce certain statutes, or provisions of statutes. See infra notes 35–39
and accompanying text. Broadly speaking, when faced with a potentially unconstitutional
statute, the President has several options: (1) he can enforce the statute and defend it
against challenges in the courts; (2) he can continue to enforce the statute, but refuse to
defend it; or (3) he can refuse to enforce or defend the statute. See infra Part I.B. The two
issues necessarily overlap and insight into the one can be gleaned from the other.
35. James Wilson, Statement before the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania (Dec.
1, 1787), reprinted in 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 446 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) (emphasis added).
36. Department of Justice Appropriation Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-132, §21(a), 93 Stat. 1049, 1049–50 (1979) (“The Attorney General shall . . . trans-
mit a report to each House of the Congress in any case in which the Attorney General . . .
determines that the Department of Justice . . . will refrain from defending any provision of
law enacted by the Congress in any proceeding before any court of the United States
. . . .”).
37. Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 251 (1867); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 85 S. Ct.1, 2 (1964) (describing the “judicial power to hold [an] act
unconstitutional [as] an awesome responsibility calling for the utmost circumspection in
its exercise”).
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[acts of Congress] when they are unconstitutional.”38 The reason a
President can legitimately refuse to obey an unconstitutional law is, in
a sense, self-evident: laws that are enacted contrary to the Constitution
are not “the supreme law of the land. They are merely acts of usurpa-
tion and . . . deserve to be treated as such.”39
Conventional doctrine holds that the executive can properly re-
fuse to defend an act of Congress in one of three situations: (1) where
the act infringes on the rights of the executive, in violation of the
separation of powers doctrine; (2) where a statute is so patently un-
constitutional that there is no serious argument that can be made for
its constitutionality; and (3) where the President believes, upon an
individual assessment, that the law is unconstitutional. The third of
these exceptions to the executive’s general duty to defend acts of Con-
gress in court is both the most controversial and the least discussed. Its
apparent origins in the conflict over the Reconstruction Acts, most
notably in Ex Parte McCardle, will be the main focus of this Article.
However, a brief overview of the less contentious exceptions is first
necessary.
1. The Separation of Powers Exception
The most common and least objectionable justification given by
Attorneys General who refuse to defend statutes concerns statutes the
executive believes infringe upon the inherent powers of the Presi-
dency. This exception appears to have been a caveat to even the earli-
est Attorney General opinions on the duty of the President to execute
laws passed by Congress.40 As Attorney General Black noted, “Con-
gress is vested with legislative power; the authority of the President is
executive. Neither has the right to interfere with the functions of the
other.”41 The general proposition that the executive has the right to
refuse to defend or enforce a statute that infringes on executive power
38. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 906 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (recognizing that the President might legiti-
mately take “measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress,” but
that his power to do so is at its “lowest ebb”). But see Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 524, 525 (1838) (“To contend that the obligations imposed on the President to see
the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their execution; is a novel construc-
tion of the constitution, and is entirely inadmissible.”).
39. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 188 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
40. See 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 468 (1860) (“Congress could not, if it would, take away
from the President, or in anywise diminish the authority conferred upon him by the
Constitution.”).
41. Id. at 469.
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has been consistently reaffirmed by commentators and Attorneys Gen-
eral to the point that “almost all of the legal authority” on the decision
not to defend statutes arises out of “situations where the Acts them-
selves touch on constitutional separation of power between Executive
and Legislative Branches.”42
One of the earliest of these cases was Myers v. United States,43 ar-
gued and decided during the Wilson Administration. In Myers, Con-
gress had passed a statute requiring the advice of the Senate for the
removal of “postmasters of the first, second, and third class.”44 Myers
was a first class postmaster who had been removed by the Postmaster
General at the direction of the President, but without the consent of
the Senate.45 When Myers brought suit, the Solicitor General ap-
peared before the Supreme Court on behalf of the United States, but
argued against the statute.46 Responsibility for defending the statute
instead fell to former Senator George Wharton Pepper, who had been
appointed by the Court to defend the interests of Congress.47 When
rising to address the Court, the attorney for the Postmaster observed:
In the 136 years that have passed since the Constitution was
adopted, there has come before this Court for the first time, so far
as I am able to determine, a case in which the Government,
through the Department of Justice, questions the constitutionality
of its own act. As to that, I have no criticism to offer; I think it is but
proper. We find the Solicitor General appearing as a representative
of the Executive Department of the Government. And we have Sen-
ator Pepper, as amicus curiae, who, as I take it from his brief, repre-
sents another branch, the Legislative branch, of the Government. I
appear as counsel for the appellant, who brought this suit in the
first instance. It is gratifying to feel that all interests are properly
represented.48
42. 4A Op. O.L.C. 55, 56 (1980). See also 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 475, 476 (1919) (stating
that “it is not within the province of the Attorney General to declare an Act of Congress
unconstitutional” except where the statute presents a “conflict between the prerogatives of
the legislative department and those of the executive department”); Days, supra note 12, at
499 (“Solicitors General have always sided with the President in disputes over the constitu-
tionality of congressional attempts to circumscribe presidential power.”); Dellinger, supra
note 12, at 315 (“The President has enhanced responsibility to resist unconstitutional pro-
visions that encroach upon the constitutional powers of the Presidency.”); Waxman, supra
note 12, at 1084 (recognizing an exception to the duty to defend where “an Act of Con-
gress raises separation of powers concerns”).
43. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
44. Id. at 86.
45. Id. at 106.
46. See Dalena Marcott, The Duty to Defend: What is in the Best Interests of the World’s Most
Powerful Client?, 92 GEO. L.J. 1311, 1329 (2004).
47. Id.
48. Myers, 272 U.S. at 57.
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The Myers Court ultimately ruled in favor of the administration,
finding that the statute unconstitutionally infringed upon the Presi-
dent’s powers.49 Yet, the Court stressed that Pepper’s appearance had
been essential in “enabling the Court to satisfy itself that it has fully
considered all that can be said.”50
A more recent example of the separation of powers exception
was the Reagan-era case of INS v. Chadha.51 In Chadha, Congress had
passed a statute “authorizing one House of Congress, by resolution, to
invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch, pursuant to authority
delegated by Congress to the Attorney General of the United States,
to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United
States.”52 Similar to Myers, the Solicitor General, Rex Lee, appeared
on behalf of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, but not on
behalf of the Immigration and Nationality Act.53 Instead, the Act was
defended by separate counsel, Michael Davidson, who represented
the Senate, and Eugene Gressman, who appeared on behalf of the
House.54 The Court considered the argument that that it lacked juris-
diction because “Chadha and the INS take the same position on the
constitutionality of the one-House veto” and that this fact meant that
there was no “controversy” for the Court to decide.55 The Court dis-
agreed, observing, “it would be a curious result if, in the administra-
tion of justice, a person could be denied access to the courts because
the Attorney General of the United States agreed with the legal argu-
ments asserted by the individual.”56
Myers and Chadha provide two clear examples of congressional
statutes in tension with the executive power that the executive has,
49. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (“[W]e must therefore hold that
the provision of the law of 1876, by which the unrestricted power of removal of first class
postmasters is denied to the President is in violation of the Constitution, and invalid.”).
50. Id. at 176–77.
51. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
52. Id. at 923. The specific facts of the case are not relevant here, but for an exhaus-
tive exploration of them, see BARBARA H. CRAIG, CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN EPIC CONSTITU-
TIONAL STRUGGLE (1988).
53. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 921.
54. See id. at 922.
55. Id. at 939.
56. Id. Nonetheless, the Court found the formal intervention of Congress in the case
to mean that “concrete adverseness is beyond doubt.” Id. A controversy also existed be-
cause the INS would have complied with the law if the Court had held it to be constitu-
tional. See id. at 939–40 (“We agree with the Court of Appeals that Chadha has asserted a
concrete controversy, and our decision will have real meaning: if we rule for Chadha, he
will not be deported; if we uphold 244(c)(2), the INS will execute its order and deport
him.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
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accordingly, declined to defend.57 These cases present fairly benign
examples of situations in which the executive has non-controversially
declined to defend acts of Congress holding separation of powers im-
plications. Indeed, an executive defense in these situations may have
been somewhat suspect. There are many other examples of the execu-
tive refusing to defend or, as in Myers and Chadha, actively arguing
against an Act of Congress.58 The facts of the individual cases vary, but
in no case does the Court’s opinion suggest a problem with the execu-
tive’s refusal.59 Indeed, there does not seem to be much objection
from any quarter to the limited practice of executive refusal to defend
statutes that raise separation of powers issues.60
2. The Patent Unconstitutionality Exception
The second exception to the duty to defend concerns situations
in which the Attorney General believes a statute to be patently uncon-
stitutional, i.e., when no professionally responsible argument can be
made in defense of the statute. This exception can be phrased in a
number of ways. It might be construed very narrowly as a situation in
which “defending the statute would require [asking] the Supreme
Court to overrule one of its constitutional precedents.”61 More
broadly, it can be portrayed as applying to situations in which “the
Attorney General believes, not only personally as a matter of con-
science, but also in his official capacity as the Chief Legal Officer of
the United States, that a law is so patently unconstitutional that it can-
not be defended.”62 Federal Judge Frank Easterbrook mockingly de-
scribed the standard this way:
One stream of argument some solicitors general have accepted is
that statutes should be defended if you can make an argument in
their favor without breaking out laughing. It is the risibility test for
57. In Myers, Congress sought to restrict the President’s ability to terminate his staff.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 107-08 (1926). In Chadha, it was a legislative attempt to
override an executive decision. See generally Chadha, 462 U.S. at 919.
58. For a list of some additional examples, see Days, supra note 12, at 499 n.70.
59. The lack of comment on the executive’s action in Myers has been cited as marking
“significant judicial approval” for that branch’s ability to refuse to defend or enforce a
statute. Dellinger, supra note 12, at 313.
60. For an example of such criticism, see James W. Cobb, Note, By “Complicated and
Indirect” Means: Congressional Defense of Statutes and the Separation of Powers, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 205, 208 (2004) (arguing that allowing Congress to defend statutes “violates our con-
stitutionally mandated separation of powers”).
61. Waxman, supra note 12, at 1085.
62. Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 9 (1975) (state-
ment of Rex Lee).
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a constitutional defense. If trying to state the defense of the statute
does not have you rolling in the aisles, you should defend the
statute.63
This exception most makes sense in situations where intervening
judicial precedents render a statutory provision unconstitutional that
“the legislature and the Executive might have considered constitu-
tional at the time of enactment.”64 It is also appropriate in cases where
the Court’s practice of only ruling on the case in front of it leaves the
constitutionality of a similar statute suspect as a result of the Court’s
decision.65 However, almost every decision not to defend a law can
conceivably claim justification under the murky “patently unconstitu-
tional” standard and, indeed, such has become the dominant prac-
tice.66 Unless the standard is read so narrowly as to apply only in
situations where there is a direct precedent on point, the exception
risks becoming so great as to entirely consume the rule. This excep-
tion does not appear to have been addressed by the courts and, in-
deed, the distinction between this exception and the “independent
assessment” discussed below is, by no means, universally accepted.
Nevertheless, “patent unconstitutionality” must remain an available
exception, for while no two fact patterns are identical, facts are often
similar enough to render defenses functionally estopped. This Article
draws a distinction between “patent unconstitutionality” and an “inde-
63. Rex E. Lee Conference on the Office of the Solicitor General of the United States: Pre-Reagan
Panel, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1, 31 (2003) (statement of Frank Easterbrook) [hereinafter Rex E.
Lee Transcript].
64. Waxman, supra note 12, at 1086; see also Rex E. Lee Transcript, supra note 63, at 30
(“[I]t was common [for the Solicitor General] not to defend . . . provisions essentially
identical to something that had been held unconstitutional.”).
65. The Supreme Court has generally refused to give “an advisory opinion upon a
hypothetical basis” and rather limits itself to an “adjudication of present right upon estab-
lished facts.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 242 (1937). As a result, a statute
is rendered constitutionally suspect, but not explicitly struck down, whenever a separate,
but substantively similar, statute is declared invalid by the Court. It would be wasteful to
defend such a statute, as the outcome is essentially predetermined.
66. Both the Reagan Administration’s decision in League of Women Voters and the
Obama Administration’s decision regarding the Defense of Marriage Act were justified in
terms of “patent unconstitutionality.” They were both, correctly, criticized by their oppo-
nents who could easily conceive of arguments in defense of the statutes. See CORNELL CLAY-
TON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY
197 (1992) (criticizing the decision in League of Women Voters because “there were powerful
arguments made by members of Congress and by attorneys within the Justice Department
itself supporting the statute”); Defending Marriage: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitu-
tion of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 57–60 (2011) (statement of Edward Whe-
lan) (arguing that Attorney General Holder’s claim to have “acted consistently” with the
standard is “clearly wrong” since “any competent lawyer could present plenty of reasonable
arguments” in defense of the statute).
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pendent assessment of unconstitutionality,” where the executive en-
gages in its own review of the statute and comes to a decision about it.
Given the separation of responsibilities between the executive and the
judiciary, this latter approach is substantially more controversial.
3. The Independent Assessment of Unconstitutionality Exception
In cases where the patent unconstitutionality exception is read so
narrowly as to become inapplicable, there exists a third, highly contro-
versial exception: situations in which the President or the Attorney
General conclude that the statute, while theoretically defensible, is
unconstitutional, even absent judicial precedent on point. Some com-
mentators recognize this category as distinct from the previous two,
while others attempt to shoehorn it into the “patently unconstitu-
tional” exception.67 This third exception is often viewed as a recent
jurisprudential development.68 In truth, it is a long-standing practice,
the origin of which appears to be founded in Ex Parte McCardle. These
cases will constitute the remainder of the discussion in this Article,
beginning with the well-known Marbury v. Madison69 and culminating
in an in-depth discussion of the slightly less famous Ex Parte McCardle.
II. Independent Refusals to Defend
A. The Early Cases
The earliest cases in which an Attorney General refused to appear
on behalf of the government were Marbury v. Madison and Hudson &
Goodwin. Strictly speaking, neither of those cases involved an executive
decision not to defend an act of Congress. However, they are worth
mentioning, if only briefly, as illustrations of the tensions that exist
when a case involving the United States is properly brought before the
Court and the executive unilaterally refuses to defend. They also illus-
trate the danger of allowing the Attorney General to exercise such a
practice without providing other parties the ability to represent the
United States.
67. Compare Waxman, supra note 12, at 1083 (“[E]ven when neither exception applies,
the Department of Justice has occasionally declined to make professionally respectable
arguments, even when available, to defend a statute—typically, in cases in which . . . the
President has concluded that the statute is unconstitutional”), with 4A Op. O.L.C. 55, 55
(1980) (arguing that the Attorney General “must examine the Acts of Congress and the
Constitution and determine what they require of him; and if he finds in a given case that
there is a conflict between the requirements of one and the requirements of the other, he
must acknowledge his dilemma and decide how to deal with it”).
68. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
69. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803).
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In Marbury, William Marbury—appointed justice of the peace by
the outgoing Adams administration—applied to the Court for a writ
of mandamus requiring new Secretary of State, James Madison, to de-
liver Marbury’s commission; an act the new administration refused to
perform.70 James Madison was nominally represented by Attorney
General Levi Lincoln. However, when the case was called, Lincoln de-
clined to make an appearance, instead announcing “he had no in-
structions on the subject, [and] thus [was] leaving the proceedings to
the discretion of the justices.”71 Instead, the trial was run by Charles
Lee, counsel to plaintiff William Marbury.72 Lincoln was subpoenaed
by the Court and initially refused to make any response at all.73 Even-
tually, Lincoln requested that he receive the questions in writing and
be afforded time to decide whether to respond.74 Madison himself
refused to appear and no attorney was present to represent him, nor
was any argument made on behalf of the government as to why a writ
should not be entered.75
Hudson & Goodwin involved a federal common law prosecution of
a pair of newspaper publishers for seditious libel.76 The case came
before the Supreme Court following a split in the circuit courts re-
garding whether the federal courts had jurisdiction over common law
crimes.77 When the case came before the Court, neither Attorney
General William Pinkney nor counsel for the defense made an ap-
pearance.78 It is likely that Pinkney was instructed not to appear on
70. Id. at 138.
71. RICHARD ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG RE-
PUBLIC 43 (1971).
72. Id.
73. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) at 144.
74. Id. Although Lincoln was Attorney General at the time, he was subpoenaed be-
cause he had previously been Secretary of State and was being called upon to explain what
had happened to Marbury’s commission; a question that Lincoln refused to answer. See
ROBERT L. CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON and Judicial Review 83 (1989). Thus, the pro-
ceedings before the Court in Marbury were entirely non-adversarial.
75. Id. at 85.
76. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32 (1812). Hudson
and Goodwin published a newspaper which had printed an article claiming that Congress
had spent two million dollars to bribe Napoleon, at the request of President Jefferson. See
WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, 2 POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 767–84 (1953).
77. Thus, like Marbury, Hudson & Goodwin did not deal with an act of Congress. In
truth, that case represented a conflict between the executive and the judiciary. See Hudson
& Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 32.
78. Id. (“Pinkney, Attorney General, in behalf of the United States, and Dana for the
Defendants, declined arguing the case.”).
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the orders of President Madison79—who opposed federal common
law jurisdiction—as Pinkney himself was a well-known proponent of
federal common law.80 Regardless of his personal opinion, however,
Pinkney did not appear and the Court issued its opinion holding that
federal courts had no jurisdiction over common law crimes.81
Justice William Johnson, who delivered the Court’s opinion in
that case, later suggested that the “true reason” Hudson & Goodwin was
not argued was “the universal opinion prevailing at the bar, that opin-
ion had . . . settled down against it.”82 Some have suggested that
Pinkney’s lack of argument supports the claim that the Court’s deci-
sion merely formally adopted a preexisting consensus.83 On the other
hand, it is almost certain that a number of the justices—as many as
three of the seven members of the Court—openly held the belief that
there was federal common law jurisdiction.84 Thus, the opinion was
arguably not as “universal” as it might seem. Perhaps the unanimity
decision was less an agreement on the issue, so much as it was a sub-
mission to the political reality of the inevitable result.85 Regardless,
with neither counsel appearing to offer an argument, the Supreme
Court found itself rendering an opinion that seemed to rest less on
legal principles than on “public opinion.”86
79. See ROBERT IRELAND, THE LEGAL CAREER OF WILLIAM PINKNEY 91 (1986) (“President
Madison doubtlessly directed Pinkney not to argue the case . . . .”).
80. HENRY WHEATON, SOME ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE, WRITINGS, AND SPEECHES OF WIL-
LIAM PINKNEY 114 (New York, Collins & Co. 1826) (“I am told that Mr. Pinkney had
formed, and frequently, expressed, a very decided opinion that the courts of the Union
possessed a common law jurisdiction . . . .”). Indeed, Pinkney had corresponded with then
Supreme Court Justice Story regarding the importance of passing legislation that would
grant “the Courts of the U.S. a common law jurisdiction as to crimes.” Letter from Su-
preme Court Justice Joseph Story to Attorney General William Pinkney (June 26, 1812),
reprinted in Gary D. Rowe, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, the
Jeffersonian Ascendency, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919, 926
(1992).
81. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 34.
82. R. CRUSH, TRIAL OF WILLIAM BUTLER FOR PIRACY 12 (1813).
83. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 80, at 926 (“By choosing not to argue the case, Pinkney
appears to have recognized that his position was outside the new constitutional consensus
that had emerged by the time Hudson reached the Supreme Court.”).
84. For a discussion of the justices’ votes, see PHILLIP BLUMBERG, REPRESSIVE JURISPRU-
DENCE IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 183 (2010).
85. See Gerald T. Dunne, Joseph Story: 1812 Overture, 77 HARV. L. REV. 240, 244 (1963)
(“Dismissal of the charge by the new Republican Supreme Court was virtually pre-
ordained.”); BLUMBERG, supra note 84, at 183–84 (“In rejecting the concept of federal crim-
inal common-law jurisdiction, the Supreme Court was only ratifying what had become the
new reality at the polls.”).
86. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32 (1812) (“Al-
though this question is brought up now for the first time to be decided by this Court, we
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Four years later, after the machinations of Justice Story, the issue
was re-presented to the Court in United States v. Coolidge.87 The new
Attorney General, Richard Rush, once again refused to argue the
case.88 In effect, his refusal was sufficient to uphold the Court’s prior
decision in Hudson & Goodwin, with Justice Johnson indicating sup-
port for the previous holding, Justice Story expressing his opposition,
and Justices Washington and Livingston indicating that they were will-
ing to rehear the question, but only if “counsel can be found ready to
argue it.”89
Hudson & Goodwin presents an interesting prologue to the ques-
tion of the Attorney General’s duty to defend acts of Congress. Here
was a situation where, in a case, “instituted on behalf of the United
States for a crime allegedly committed against the government, the
Attorney General of the United States . . . refused to appear to argue
on behalf of the constitutionality of the prosecution that . . . he had
previously supported.”90 More troubling was the ability of Attorney
General Rush to prevent a constitutional issue from being heard
before the Supreme Court, simply by refusing to appear in Coolidge.
Here, unlike the cases discussed next, there was no obvious available
party to intervene. While arguments can be made for allowing a
branch of government to defend itself against another branch, it is
less clear that it is appropriate for an administration to refuse to ap-
pear because it opposes a law as a matter of politics.
B. Ex Parte McCardle
1. The Reconstruction Acts of 1867
After the American Civil War, beginning in March 1867, Con-
gress passed four statutes collectively known as the Reconstruction
Acts of 1867.91 The statutes were enacted over the veto of President
Andrew Johnson, who had also vetoed several other Reconstruction
Era statutes up to that point.92 Among other things, the first of the
consider it as having been long since settled in public opinion.”).
87. 14 U.S. (14 Wheat.) 415 (1816).
88. Id. at 415–16.
89. Id. at 416.
90. BLUMBERG, supra note 84, at 182.
91. Act of Mar. 11, 1868, ch. 25, 15 Stat. 41 (1868); Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14
Stat. 428 (1867); Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2 (1867); Act of July 19, 1867, ch. 30,
15 Stat. 14 (1867).
92. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 247–51
(1988).
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Acts divided the “rebel states” into five military districts93 and directed
the President to appoint “an officer of the army, not below the rank of
brigadier-general,” to command each district.94 The Acts further
granted to the military commander of each district the power to “pro-
tect all persons in their rights of person and property, to suppress
insurrection, disorder, and violence, and to punish . . . all disturbers
of the public peace and criminals.”95 To that end, the military com-
mander was to “organize military commissions or tribunals” for the
purpose of punishing the offenders.96 The Acts provided for a conven-
tion to be called in order to create a new government for each of the
recently conquered states and to adopt new state constitutions that
were amenable to the federal Congress.97 It provided that the dele-
gates to this convention were to be elected from “male citizens of said
State, twenty-one years old and upward, of whatever race, color, or
previous condition, who have been resident of said State for one year
previous to the election, except such as may be disfranchised for par-
ticipation in the rebellion.”98 This final provision, the exclusion of
those who had participated in “the rebellion,” served to effectively dis-
franchise all southern whites and create a convention that would be
almost entirely made up of newly enfranchised blacks, as well as re-
cent arrivals to the South from the North—the so-called
“carpetbaggers.”99
In his veto message, substantially written by legendary lawyer and
former Chief Justice of Pennsylvania, Attorney General and Secretary
of State, Jeremiah S. Black, together with Attorney General Henry
Stanbery,100 Andrew Johnson echoed many of the same concerns re-
garding the disfranchisement. His primary objection, however, was
the imposition of military rule on the southern states. The veto mes-
sage propounded upon the unconstitutionality of the Act, enumerat-
ing the constitutional rights that had been stripped from the citizenry
of the southern states by the establishment of the military
commissions:
93. Preamble, 14 Stat. at 428.
94. Id. § 2.
95. Id. § 3.
96. Id.
97. Id. § 5.
98. Id.
99. SEVER EUBANK, THE MCCARDLE CASE 7 (1954); see also FAIRMAN, supra note 17, at
260 (noting that the requirement of “unbroken loyalty” would “include the mass of freed-
man, but comparatively few Southern whites.”).
100. FAIRMAN, supra note 17, at 307.
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[A]n Act of Congress is proposed which if carried out would deny a
trial by the lawful courts and juries to nine million American citi-
zens and their posterity for an indefinite period. It seems scarcely
possible that any one should seriously believe this consistent with a
Constitution which declares in simple, plain language that all per-
sons should have that right, and that no person shall ever in any
case be deprived of it. The Constitution also forbids the arrest of
the citizen without judicial warrant, founded on probable cause.
This bill authorizes arrest without warrant at the pleasure of a mili-
tary commander.101
The message asserted that the obligation of the federal govern-
ment to provide the states with a republican form of government
could not possibly be met with the passage of an act which “wipes away
ever [sic] vestige of republican government . . . and puts the life, prop-
erty, liberty and honor of all the people [in the southern states] under
the domination of a single person clothed with unlimited author-
ity[.]”102 In a particularly strong passage, the message raged:
Those who advocated the right of secession alleged in their own
justification that we had no regard for law, and that their rights of
property, life, and liberty would not be safe under the Constitution
as administered by us. If we now verify their assertion, we prove
that they were in truth and in fact fighting for their liberty, and
instead of branding their leaders with the dishonoring name of
traitors against a righteous and legal Government, we elevate them
in history to the rank of self-sacrificing patriots [and] consecrate
them to the admiration of the world . . . .103
Nevertheless, the House and Senate quickly overcame the veto
and the bill became law. Shortly thereafter, the President and Attor-
ney General’s objection to the constitutionality of the Act would lead
to one of the more interesting legal dramas of the period.
2. The Arrest of William McCardle for Impeding Reconstruction
William McCardle was a Vicksburg newspaperman.104 Beginning
in the 1850s, McCardle became a strong proponent of states’ rights
and left the newspaper to join the Confederate Army when the war
broke out.105 After the war, McCardle became editor of the Vicksburg
Times, which had recently been established as a post-war platform for
states’ rights arguments.106 As editor of one of the most popular news-
101. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1971 (1867).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. EUBANK, supra note 99, at 11.
105. Id. at 12–13.
106. Id. at 13.
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papers in Mississippi, McCardle found himself embroiled in the con-
flict between the southern states and the military reconstruction.
In March 1867, General Edward Ord was given command of the
Fourth Military District107 and instructed to organize the constitu-
tional convention required by the Reconstruction Acts.108 Despite his
role as military commander, Ord was fairly well regarded by the re-
sidents of Mississippi.109 Ord began by creating a board of registrars
for each county, but the requirement that no registrar have fought
against the Union meant that they were “for the most part freedman,
military officers, and ex-Union soldiers who had settled in the state
since the close of the war.”110
Many white residents of Mississippi found this process intolerable
and “declared that the state was no longer a fit habitation for white
men.”111 Chief among the critics was McCardle, who published a se-
ries of scathing editorials attacking Ord, the convention, and military
rule. He described the military commanders as “infamous, cowardly,
and abandoned villains.”112 More disruptively, McCardle encouraged
white voters to boycott the convention and threatened recourse
against those who voted in it. After his case gained national attention,
the New York Times published key excerpts of McCardle’s editorials:
Stay Away from the Polls.—We again urge every decent white man,
every honorable gentleman of the Caucasian race, to avoid Gen.
Ord’s election as he would avoid pestilence and a prison. As this
advice does not apply to and is not intended for the white snakes of
the Loyal League, we shall expect the last-named despicable ver-
min out in all their strength . . .
The Immortal Fight.—We are gratified to be able to announce to the
readers of the Times that at the Court-house yesterday, the only
place open to the whole people, there were cast the votes of eight
white people only! We tried to get the names of the interesting
sneaks who voted, but failed, though the Times office was and is
ready to pay a dollar for the name of each voter. We shall publish
the names of these voters if we can obtain them, and some day we
shall; but if we do not, we shall with pride chronicle the fact that in
107. JAMES W. GARNER, RECONSTRUCTION IN MISSISSIPPI 161 (1901).
108. Id. at 171.
109. Id. at 161–62.
110. Id. at 172.
111. Id. at 175.
112. William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229,
236 n.42 (1973).
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the heroic city of Vicksburg, . . . there were only eight cowards,
dogs, and scoundrels of the Nygatt and McKee stripe.113
On November 8, 1867, Ord had McCardle arrested.114 McCardle
was to be tried before a military commission on four charges: (1) dis-
turbance of the public peace; (2) inciting insurrection, disorder, and
violence; (3) libel, for the pieces he had written against Ord person-
ally; and (4) “impeding reconstruction” for his editorials encouraging
white voters not to vote for delegates to the convention.115
On November 11, counsel for McCardle sought a writ of habeas
corpus before the United States District Judge at the federal court in
Jackson, Mississippi, claiming that McCardle’s “arrest and detention is
in contravention of the Constitution and laws of the United States.”116
Judge Hill issued the writ on November 21, and held a three-day hear-
ing on the issue.117 On November 25, Judge Hill issued his opinion
ruling against McCardle, but also granting $2000 bail pending ap-
peal.118 In that opinion, after tracing the history of the Reconstruction
Acts, Judge Hill drew an analogy between tribunals that had been cre-
ated by the provisional Governors at the direction of the President
and the military commissions authorized by Congress.119 Noting that
the judicial tribunals established by the Provisional Governor arose
not “by means of any express provision of the Constitution, but . . . out
of the necessity of the condition of the State,” Judge Hill noted that
he was unable to draw a distinction between the Governor’s exercise
of that power, as authorized by the President, and the exercise of the
same power by the military commander, as authorized by Congress.120
“[I]f it is the duty of the government of the United States . . . to pro-
113. Reconstruction: A Test Case in the United States Supreme Court—The Opposition to the
Laws in Mississippi—An Irate Editor on the Officers and Operations of the Freedmen’s Bureau, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 1868, at 2 [hereinafter A Test Case in the United States Supreme Court].
114. FAIRMAN, supra note 17, at 437.
115. Id. at 437–38.
116. Id. at 438.
117. Id.
118. Id. Judge Hill’s opinion was not reported in the Federal Reporter, but was widely
reproduced in newspapers.
119. Shortly after taking office, President Johnson appointed Provisional Governors in
the Confederate States and created tribunals to put “the laws of the United States into
operation.” JOHN SAVAGE, THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF ANDREW JOHNSON 373–75
(1866). The authority of these tribunals had been challenged in the state courts in Scott v.
Billgerry, 40 Miss. 119 (1866). The High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi held
that the tribunals were federal in nature; arising out of the President’s power to create
governments “while holding a State under absolute military rule.” Id. at 143. The court
further held that inherent in this right to create a provisional government was the right to
“ordain laws, and to establish judicial tribunals for their administration.” Id.
120. A Test Case in the United States Supreme Court, supra note 113, at 2.
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tect the citizens in their rights of person and property” Judge Hill ex-
plained, “then the choice of means must be made by the power
conferring such authority.”121 Hill refused to find the Reconstruction
Acts unconstitutional.122
3. The Attorney General Refuses to Defend the Reconstruction
Acts
McCardle appealed Judge Hill’s decision to the Supreme Court
on December 23, 1867.123 On December 31, Attorney General Henry
Stanbery wrote to the Acting Secretary of War, Ulysses S. Grant,124 to
express his intention not to appear in the case:
I beg leave to call your attention to case No. 380 on the calendar of
the Supreme Court of the United States for this term, entitled Ex
parte McCardle. . . . I do not propose to appear in the case. As the
matter appertains to your Department, I will suggest to you the
propriety of employing counsel to represent the parties having Mc-
Cardle in custody, so that the case may receive proper attention
before the Supreme Court.125
Stanbery’s letter prompted a flurry of correspondence from the
War Department, discussing new counsel to represent the United
States. A telegram was sent to General Ord asking whether “it is advisa-
ble to employ the same council [sic] that managed the McCardle Case
in Mississippi to appear for the United States in the appeal to the su-
121. Id.
122. Id. At the close of his opinion, Hill also expressed relief that “the law has provided
a direct appeal to the Supreme Court . . . where any error I may have committed can be
corrected.” Id. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 had amended the Judiciary Act of 1789 to
allow for an appeal of habeas decisions to the Supreme Court. Act of Feb. 5 1867, ch. 28,
14 Stat. 385, 386 (1867).
123. FAIRMAN, supra note 17, at 449.
124. Johnson had removed Stanton and replaced him with General Grant. See ERIC L.
MCKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 494–99 (1960). This would set in mo-
tion Johnson’s ultimate blatant violation of the Tenure of Office Act, which would lead to
his impeachment. See EDMUND GIBSON ROSS, HISTORY OF THE IMPEACHMENT OF ANDREW
JOHNSON 57–64 (1868). The Tenure of Office Act was ultimately declared unconstitutional
in Myers, discussed supra Part I.B.1. Curiously, in calling for the impeachment of Johnson,
certain members of Congress argued that “to allow the President the power to violate an
act of Congress . . . in order to make up an issue before the courts upon the question of its
constitutionality, would be virtually to attribute to the President the once hated royal
power of suspending the law at the pleasure of the Executive.” JOHN W. BURGESS, RECON-
STRUCTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 182 (1902).
125. Letter from Attorney General Henry Stanbery to Secretary of War Ulysses S. Grant
(Dec. 31, 1867), in 18 THE PAPERS OF ULYSSES S. GRANT 99 (John Simon, ed., 1991).
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preme court here.”126 A few days letter, Grant wrote Senator Lyman
Trumbull of Illinois:
The case, exparte [sic] W.H. McCardle, appealed from the circuit
court of So. Dist. of Miss. to the Supreme Court of the United
States it is believed may soon be called up. The Attorney General of
the United States having expressed his intention not to appear in
the case this Department desires to engaged [sic] your professional
services for that object.127
On January 11, 1868, Senator Trumbull agreed.128 Trumbull was
in many ways an obvious choice. He was the chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee and “[o]ne of the most influential men in Con-
gress.”129 Perhaps more importantly, Trumbull was a moderate who
played a key role in the drafting of both the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill
and the Civil Rights Bill, the first legislative attempt to give meaning to
the Thirteenth Amendment.130 Trumbull also had played a significant
role in justifying Radical Reconstruction, arguing that Congress must
“enter these States and hurl from power the disloyal element which
controls and governs them.”131
Trumbull engaged James Hughes and Senator Matthew Carpen-
ter of Wisconsin as co-counsel.132 Writing to Carpenter, Trumbull
explained:
I was retained on behalf of the Government by General Grant . . . .
Judge Hughes is also with me, and I am authorized by General
Grant and also Mr. Stanton to retain you . . . . Please let me hear
from you at once, and come on as soon as your convenience will
permit. If the validity of the reconstruction acts is to be determined
by the decision, it is the most important case ever submitted to a
court.133
Thus, when the Supreme Court met to hear Jeremiah Black’s mo-
tion to advance the case,134 the United States was represented by a
126. Telegram from General Edmund Schriver to General Edward Ord (Jan. 4, 1868),
in 18 THE PAPERS OF ULYSSES S. GRANT 99 (John Simon, ed., 1991).
127. Letter from Secretary of War Ulysses S. Grant to Senator Lyman Trumbull (Jan 8,
1868), in 18 THE PAPERS OF ULYSSES S. GRANT 99 (John Simon, ed., 1991).
128. Letter from Senator Lyman Trumbull to Secretary of War Ulysses S. Grant (Jan 11,
1868), in 18 THE PAPERS OF ULYSSES S. GRANT 99 (John Simon, ed., 1991).
129. FONER, supra note 92, at 243.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 272.
132. Letter from Senator Lyman Trumbull to Senator Matthew Carpenter (Jan. 22,
1868), reprinted in CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 1702 (1872).
133. Id.
134. A motion to advance is a motion to expedite the hearing and decision where “the
importance of the result to [the appellant is] sufficient to warrant the preference asked for
over suitors having prior cases on the docket.” McGuire v. Massachusetts, 70 U.S. 382, 384
(1865); see also United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 558, 558 (1875) (granting the motion to
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sitting senator, rather than a member of the executive branch.135
Stanbery was present, however. He explained to the Court that he had
previously informed the President that he believed the military com-
missions were not constitutional and “[t]his being his opinion, he
could not, of course, take the other side of the question.”136 This left
Jeremiah Black and Lyman Trumbull to debate whether the case
should be advanced. On January 21, Chief Justice Chase declared,
with a majority of the Court concurring, that the case would be ad-
vanced.137 For his part, McCardle was thrilled. The day following the
Court’s announcement, the Vicksburg Daily Times reported:
When it comes up, the whole question of the validity of the recon-
struction acts will be ably and elaborately argued, and the question
of the Constitutionality of the acts will be finally put to rest. The
decision of the highest tribunal known to our laws will be looked
for with the deepest interest . . . The lives and liberties of the whole
people are involved, for the decision of the Court will determine
whether ours in [sic] a government of Law or a naked military
despotism.138
4. Reactions to Stanbery’s Decision
Stanbery’s decision not to appear caused a good deal of contro-
versy. This was not the first time that Stanbery had refused to argue a
position before the Court. In Ex Parte Milligan,139 two years earlier,
Stanbery had appeared along with Attorney General James Speed and
Benjamin F. Butler.140 However, Stanbery appeared only to argue that
the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over the appeal under
the Judiciary Act of 1802.141 Specifically, Stanbery argued that an ex
parte action was not yet a “cause” that could be appealed under the
relevant portion of the Judiciary Act and, therefore, the Court lacked
jurisdiction over ex parte habeas petitions.142 The Court rejected this
advance where “the questions in dispute will embarrass the operations of the government
while they remain unsettled”).
135. FAIRMAN, supra note 17, at 450.
136. Supreme Court: The Case of Col. W. H. McCardle—Arguments of Judge Black and Senator
Trumbull, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1868, at 8.
137. FAIRMAN, supra note 17, at 450.
138. The McCardle Case, VICKSBURG DAILY TIMES, Jan. 22, 1868, at 4.
139. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
140. Id. at 9.
141. Id. (“Mr. Stanbery confining himself to the question of jurisdiction under the act
of 1802.”).
142. Id. at 10–13.
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argument, holding that “[i]n any legal sense, action, suit, and cause,
are convertible terms.”143
Similarly, very shortly before refusing to appear in McCardle,
Stanbery had appeared on behalf of the government in Georgia v. Stan-
ton,144 a case involving the very Reconstruction Acts at issue in McCar-
dle.145 In that case, the State of Georgia argued that the
Reconstruction Acts served to
overthrow and to annul this existing State government, and to
erect another and different government in its place, unauthorized
by the Constitution and in defiance of its guarantees; and that, in
furtherance of this intent and design, the defendants . . . acting
under orders of the President, were about setting in motion a por-
tion of the army to take military possession of the State, and
threatened to subvert her government, and to subject her people
to military rule; that the State was wholly inadequate to resist the
power and force of the Executive Department of the United States.
She therefore insisted that such protection could, and ought, to be
afforded by a decree, or order, of this court in the premises.146
Although he would later, in McCardle, reason that these Acts were
unconstitutional for many of the same reasons Georgia put forth in
Stanton, Stanbery argued not that the Acts were unconstitutional, but
rather that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.147 Specifi-
cally, Stanbery argued that the question of whether Georgia even qual-
ified as a state was a political question inappropriate for the Court to
resolve.148 This time, the Court accepted Stanbery’s argument.149
143. Id. at 112.
144. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 52.
147. Id. at 53–54 (“Our first objection is that we have not such parties here as authorize
this court to entertain any case. Who is this controversy with? It is with officers of the
United States of a very high grade. Is it with them as individuals? Not at all; but with them
as officers of the United States, who have no State citizenship . . . . Now, when you are
asked to entertain the limited jurisdiction given to this court in an original case, and find
that as to parties it must, by the terms of the Constitution, be a controversy between ‘a State
and citizens of another State,’ is there anything that fulfils [sic] the idea of such a
controversy?”).
148. Id. at 56–57 (“Opposite counsel allege that Georgia is now a State of the Union,
and ask the court to find that it is so. If they allege it as a matter of fact, we have a right to
deny it; and what is the consequence? If this court has jurisdiction to decide that Georgia is
a State, it has just the same jurisdiction to decide that Georgia is not a State, and that great
political question, State or not a State, is settled and settled forever by this court.”).
149. Writing for the Court, Justice Nelson explained, “the rights for the protection of
which our authority is invoked, are the rights of sovereignty, of political jurisdiction, of
government, of corporate existence as a State, with all its constitutional powers and privi-
leges.” Id. at 77. Justice Nelson held that the Court lacked jurisdiction to protect these
rights and that the case had to be dismissed since “[n]o case of private rights or private
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In McCardle, however, it was Senator Trumbull who opened
before the Court by denying jurisdiction for the case to be brought at
all.150 Others since have asked why Stanbery himself could not have
argued lack of jurisdiction, or some other point, and engaged co-
counsel to handle the merits of McCardle’s claim as had been previ-
ously done in Milligan.151 Stanbery had publically explained his posi-
tion on the Reconstruction Acts in a speech at a Democratic Party
banquet several days before the case was heard:
[T]he Constitution is not silent. It has anticipated what has hap-
pened. It provides for insurrection, whether small or great—
whether of a part of a State or of an entire State, whether in one
State or in many. . . . . Where, in this instrument, providing for the
very case of insurrection, for the very remedy to be applied, where
do you find the power to put down insurrection in a State, and
then to destroy the State and hold it and its people as conquered
and subjugated? . . . Where does Congress find its warrant in time
of peace to suspend the habeas corpus, to take away the inestimable
privilege of trial by jury, . . . and, finally, to try, to condemn, to
punish, to imprison, to hang, these people for civil offences or pre-
tended offences by the judgment of a military Court? . . . Gentle-
men, I have been at the bar for nearly half a century, and have
been a constant student not only of the common law, but of our
own constitutional law; and I do not hesitate to say that the whole
of these Reconstruction acts of Congress, from beginning to
end, . . . are unconstitutional and void. There are times when to be
silent is to be unfaithful. There are times when men must speak
out.152
It would later be alleged that Stanbery’s speech—given in his ca-
pacity as a politician—was behind his refusal to appear before the
Court.153 At the time, much of the congressional concern focused on
property infringed, or in danger of actual or threatened infringement, is presented by the
bill, in a judicial form, for the judgment of the court.” Id.
150. Trumbull’s initial argument was that the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 did not grant
jurisdiction for this type of case to be appealed to the Supreme Court. HORACE WHITE, THE
LIFE OF LYMAN TRUMBULL 328 (1913) (“It was Trumbull’s contention that McCardle fell
within this exception [i.e., the “charged with military offenses” exception to the Act], and
hence that the right of appeal so far as he was concerned, did not exist.”); see also, D.F.
MURPHY, ARGUMENT OF HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, MARCH 4, 1868, IN THE MATTER OF Ex Parte William H. McCardle, Appellant 3 (D.F.
Murphy, ed., Wash., Government Prtg. Office 1868) (“I shall commence what I have to say
by denying the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court under the act of February 5, 1867, to hear
this cause; and if I establish that proposition, of course this court cannot entertain jurisdic-
tion of it.”).
151. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1868).
152. Battle of New Orleans: Democratic Banquet at Washington in Honor of the Day, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 1868, at 1.
153. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d sess. 983 (1868) (Statement of John Conness)
(alleging that it was at this speech “where, for the first time, [Stanbery] developed, not
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the fact that, by announcing his decision at the convention, Stanbery
was engaging in political showmanship—a charge leveled at every
President or Attorney General since who has unilaterally declared an
act unconstitutional.154 However, from this vantage point, it is not
clear that scrutiny on the venue was logically founded. The basis that
Stanbery’s decision was motivated by his professional opinion, as pro-
vided to the President, appears to have been viewed as more ethically
acceptable.155 Yet it is difficult to imagine a statute’s proponents feel-
ing particularly comfortable with an attorney who, in his non-legal,
political capacity, declares a statute “unconstitutional and void,”156 but
nevertheless officially purports to defend it. At its core, the objection
appears not to have been that Stanbery should only have commented
on the statute in his political capacity, but rather that he commented
on it in a political capacity at all.157 Reaction in the press to Stanbery’s
decision was mixed. For example, the Daily National Intelligencer, a
noted pro-Administration paper,158 lauded Stanbery’s moral scruples
when it wrote:
It occasioned no surprise among well-informed persons that the
conscientious Attorney General should signify in open court, as he
did yesterday, his disinclination to assume the post of advocate of
the usurpers of Congress in the McCardle case in the Supreme
Court . . . . [I]t is not for a lawyer of such eminent consistency in
his constitutional views, and of such character as Henry Stanbery,
to appear . . . in a position directly opposite to his opinion, while
able and zealous counsel are available who could defend General
Ord without sacrifice of conviction.159
Newspapers supporting the Radical Republican elements160 of
Congress, however, were less charitable. The Lowell Daily Citizen and
News of Massachusetts bluntly declaring that “Mr. Stanberry [sic], the
before a court, but before a set of politicians organizing for the political control of the
country, his conscientious scruples to further appear as an attorney in behalf of the United
States where questions involving the acts of reconstruction were involved . . .”).
154. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.
155. See generally infra note 184.
156. See supra note 153.
157. See infra note 174.
158. See ROBERT W. WINSTON, ANDREW JOHNSON: PLEBIAN AND PATRIOT 532 (1969)
(describing the Intelligencer as “President Johnson’s organ”).
159. Editorial, The McCardle Case, NAT’L INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 11, 1868, at C.
160. Often contrasted with the “conservative” Republican faction, which included Pres-
ident Lincoln, the Radical Republicans were vehement abolitionists dedicated to racial
equality and to the suppression of the unrepentant South. They were strong opponents of
the conciliatory Reconstruction policies offered by Lincoln and Johnson. See generally Allan
G. Bogue, Historians and Radical Republicans: A Meaning For Today, 70 J. AM. HIST. 7 (1983)
(analyzing the historical treatment of the Radical Republicans who were in Congress dur-
ing the Civil War).
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federal attorney-general at Washington seems to have some very queer
ideas as to his duties as the law-officer of the government.”161 The
paper went on to ask:
We would like to know whether Mr. Stanberry [sic] is the Attorney
General of the United States, and as such bound to uphold and
defend the laws of his government, or is the private attorney of Mr.
Andrew Johnson, who is doing all he can to break down the laws,
and thwart the intentions of the law making power of the
government?
According to his own statement he is now filling the latter position,
and we recommend him to surrender his portfolio to someone
who will attend to the duties of the office, and appear on behalf of
the United States, when their interests are dragged into court.162
These newspaper columns represent the two basic reactions to
Stanbery’s announcement, both among the press and among the legal
and political world generally: respect for Stanbery’s refusal to adopt a
legal position in which he did not believe, versus contempt that the
government’s lawyer refused to represent the government.
Curiously, there was little congressional response to Stanbery’s
decision at the time. For Congress, the crisis presented by the Su-
preme Court’s decision to advance McCardle, regardless of Stanbery’s
participation, posed a very real possibility that the Reconstruction Acts
would be struck down. Contemporary belief was that the Court’s deci-
sion to advance the case on the docket had been decided by a vote of
5–4, and thus a hearing on the merits would result in the same out-
come.163 Faced with the likelihood of such a devastating defeat, Con-
gress had little time to criticize the actions of the Attorney General.164
For his part, Trumbull made a series of motions and arguments de-
signed to slow down the appeal.165 Meanwhile, the members of Con-
gress made preparations to repeal the Court’s jurisdiction over the
case.166
161. LOWELL (MASS.) DAILY CITIZEN AND NEWS, Jan. 15, 1868, at E.
162. Id.
163. CHARLES WARREN, 3 THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 187–88
(Beard Books 1999) (1922). The expectation was that Justices Grier, Clifford, Nelson, Da-
vis, and Field would vote to strike down the Acts. Id. Indeed, Chief Justice Chase later wrote
to Judge Hill that “had the merits of the McCardle Case been decided the Court would
doubtless have held that [McCardle’s] imprisonment before a military commission was
illegal.” FAIRMAN, supra note 17, at 494.
164. Also distracting Congress, as McCardle percolated, was Congress’s simultaneous
attempt to impeach Andrew Johnson. The timeline of these various events is highly over-
lapping. For a detailed discussion of these competing chronologies, see FAIRMAN, supra
note 17, 450–67.
165. See FAIRMAN, supra note 17, at 451.
166. See BURGESS, supra note 124, at 197.
674 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
Stanbery’s decision not to appear was not debated in Congress
until the end of February 1868, and even then, only somewhat tangen-
tially. The impetus for that debate was yet another case challenging
the validity of the Reconstruction Acts: Georgia v. Grant.167 Knowing
Stanbery would not appear, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, sent a
letter to the Senate asking for “a joint resolution authorizing the Sec-
retary of War to employ counsel for the purpose” of defending the
generals who were named as defendants.168 It seems likely that the
request from Stanton was, at least in part, intended to draw political
attention to Stanbery’s refusal. After all, as Thomas Hendricks of Indi-
ana pointed out, it was not at all clear that it was “necessary to pass
[the] resolution, in view of the fact that the Departments, including
the War Department, [had] been in the habit of employing counsel at
their discretion.”169 While the resolution’s passage was widely consid-
ered a foregone conclusion,170 congressional debate over the resolu-
tion allowed the members of Congress to officially weigh in on the
propriety of the Attorney General’s actions. Comments given during
the Senate debate on the resolution followed the same general struc-
ture of that already being had in the media. For example, Jacob How-
ard of Michigan, a well-known Radical,171 was outraged:
167. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 241 (1868). Grant was a follow-on case to Georgia v. Stanton, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1868). It was thought that Grant had presented an argument that solved
some of the jurisdictional questions that had undermined Stanton. The basic facts involved
the decision of General Meade to remove the Governor and the State Treasurer for refus-
ing to levy certain taxes and to appoint two military officers to those positions. The recently
deposed Governor took the money from the state’s treasury and fled to New York, while
filing suit against the various military officers involved in the case. Because the money had
been removed, the military was required to seize certain state property to fund their opera-
tions. Accordingly, Georgia was not only able to allege that it was a free state that was
entitled to constitutional protections, but also that it was the owner of a considerable
amount of property that had been seized by the defendants and establish the property
claim that the Court had been looking for in the Stanton case. See FAIRMAN, supra note 17, at
434–36.
168. Letter from Secretary of War Edwin Stanton to Senator Henry Wilson (Feb. 5,
1868), reprinted in CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 981 (1868).
169. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 981 (1868). Hendricks suggested Stanton’s
request was “simply a parade of the matter for some purpose beyond the mere necessity of
obtaining congressional permission to do the thing asked.” Id. at 983.
170. The only real objections were from Senator Hendricks, who viewed it as unneces-
sary and saw it as a political stunt, id., and Reverdy Johnson, who wanted to make sure that
the resolution was confined to cases arising under the Reconstruction Acts. Id. at 981. The
Resolution passed the House by a vote of 115 to 37. Id. at 992.
171. See generally Earl Maltz, Radical Politics and Constitutional Theory: Senator Jacob M.
Howard of Michigan and the Problem of Reconstruction, 32 MICH. HIST. REV. 19, 20 (2006) (not-
ing that Howard had been described as a “consistent radical” and “part of the ‘radical
nucleus’ within the Republican party”).
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It is notorious that the Attorney General of the United States,
whose duty it would be ordinarily to appear as counsel . . . and
whose duty it is by the law of the land so to appear, has, upon a very
important occasion, declined to appear for [the War] Department
in the Supreme Court . . . .
. . . It seems to me strange, sir, that an office of that high grade and
of that solemn responsibility should, under any circumstances,
before a judgment has been pronounced by the Supreme Court of
the United States, have entertained and expressed the opinion that
the legislation of Congress was unconstitutional and void.172
Similarly, John Conness of California observed that,
[I]t would have become the Attorney General, the day and the
hour that he could not appear in behalf of laws passed by the Con-
gress of the United States and for their vindication in the courts of
the country, to lay down his commission and retire to private
practice.173
On the other hand, supporters claimed that Stanbery had done
nothing more than perform his duty as an attorney. For instance, Gar-
rett Davis of Kentucky declared that Stanbery had merely given the
President his legal opinion that the Reconstruction Acts were uncon-
stitutional and therefore had “shown no dereliction in the perform-
ance of his duty in [the] matter.”174 Thomas Hendricks, a Democrat
from Indiana and prominent opponent of the Reconstruction Acts,175
spoke at length about the duties of an attorney:
[Is it] the duty of the Attorney General to go before [the Supreme
Court] and make an argument that he does not believe? I wish I
had before me the statutes of the State of Indiana, which . . . [de-
clare] that [an] attorney shall be true to the court in an argument
of a question of law and true to the jury in the argument of a ques-
tion of fact. . . . [T]he Attorney General or any other attorney,
whether employed by the Government or otherwise, must speak
what he believes to be the law.176
John Sherman of Ohio, a moderate Republican who was a noted
opponent of President Johnson,177 as well as the younger brother to
noted Union General William T. Sherman, offered a similar defense
of the Attorney General:
I do not think the Attorney General ought to be called upon in any
case to act where he has openly committed himself to the opinion
172. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 981–82 (1868).
173. Id. at 983.
174. Id. at 982.
175. See JOHN W. HOLCOMBE & HUBERT M. SKINNER, LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF
THOMAS A. HENDRICKS 265–69 (1886).
176. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1868).
177. THEODORE E. BURTON, 2 american statesmen, Second Series, John Sherman 158
(Standard Library ed. 1906).
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that the law which he is defending is unconstitutional. I am not
disposed to cast stones at the Attorney General for this opinion,
because he was required, in performing the highest duty of his of-
fice, in giving advice to the President of the United States, to pass
semi judicially upon these laws . . . . He undoubtedly gave the opin-
ion . . . that the principal, main, and leading provisions of the re-
construction acts are unconstitutional. I have no doubt that the
Attorney General was honest in that opinion . . . . He having given
that opinion and come to that conclusion, as a matter of course it
is improper for Congress to call upon him to contend for the con-
stitutionality of the very acts which he has pronounced
unconstitutional.178
Echoing arguments regarding the inherent duties of an attorney,
Reverdy Johnson of Maryland also supported Stanbery’s decision. Not-
ing that Stanbery had already publically offered an opinion on the
Reconstruction Acts, an opinion no one contended was insincere,
Johnson asked,
Suppose that [Stanbery] was to appear in the Supreme Court . . .
and [have] his own opinion . . . cited against him, what answer
could he make? Could he say that he had changed that opin-
ion? . . . It would therefore, in my view, have been very improper in
[sic] him to appear in the Supreme Court in these cases, because it
would not be doing justice to the controversy, to the legislation of
Congress. It is much better that the laws . . . be vindicated by coun-
sel who have not only not given any opinion to the contrary, but
who entertain an opinion in consonance with the views of
Congress . . . .179
As it was a widely deemed a foregone conclusion that the funds
would be approved, the House debate on the resolution was much
shorter and largely mocking. When James Garfield of Ohio intro-
duced the resolution, Glenni Scofield of Pennsylvania sarcastically re-
marked that he had been under the impression that “we had an
Attorney General, whom we paid a high salary, to perform this duty;
and I want to ask the gentleman what has become of him, and why he
is not on hand to plead the cause of our country before the courts?”180
Garfield responded, hypothesizing that perhaps the Attorney General
was so busy “writing vetoes of reconstruction bills and making
speeches to Democratic meetings . . . that he cannot give his attention
to a matter of this sort.”181 When Samuel Randall of Pennsylvania ex-
pressed concern over the amount of money that might be expended
on outside counsel, as well as the danger that the executive might
178. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 982 (1868).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 991.
181. Id.
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potentially employ political cronies as outside counsel when they were
not truly necessary, Garfield quipped, “[t]he only reason this joint res-
olution is necessary is because the Attorney General has gone over to
[Randall’s] party and is declaring in open court that he declines to act
for the Government in cases of this sort.”182 When an overwhelming
majority nonetheless passed the resolution, Abner Harding of Illinois
jokingly suggested its title be amended to “a joint resolution to supply
executive deficiencies without impeachment.”183
It is worth noting that, while legitimate objections were raised
over the lack of congressional oversight in a bill which authorized the
executive to hire outside counsel without further authorization, and
while Congressman Randall’s concerns regarding the danger that em-
ploying outside counsel would turn into a patronage system were legit-
imate, no one seemed to seriously believe that Stanbery should have
appeared before the Supreme Court in either McCardle or Grant. Parti-
san joking aside, the core of congressional objection concerned
Stanbery’s declaration that the law was unconstitutional in the first
place. While there was some dispute over whether Stanbery had made
that declaration in a private or formal capacity,184 there was little disa-
greement that once he had done so, he ought to be disqualified as
counsel.185 Claims that the resolution should never have been neces-
sary rested not on the view that Stanbery should be compelled to ap-
pear on the United States’ behalf, but on the notion that it was
inappropriate for him to be passing judgment on the constitutionality
of statutes.186 Alternatively, opponents believed that, once he could
not in good faith defend an act of Congress, Stanbery should have
182. Id. at 992.
183. Id.
184. Compare CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1868) (“Mr. Conness: ‘The first
time . . . that I have any recollection [of Stanbery’s indicating that the Acts were unconsti-
tutional] was at a certain political celebration . . . where, for the first time, he developed,
not before a court, but before a set of politicians . . . his conscientious scruples.’”), with id.
at 982 (“Mr. Davis: ‘In the first place, he said he had been called upon officially by the
President of the United States to give his opinion in relation to the validity of the constitu-
tionality of the reconstruction acts . . . [and, having advised that they were unconstitu-
tional] he therefore declined to appear.’”).
185. Instead, the debate was over whether Stanbery should have offered the opinion at
all and once offered whether the appropriate course was to resign his office. See supra notes
172–82. Stanbery was heavily involved in the decision to veto the acts, so it seems likely that
he sincerely believed them unconstitutional from the outset. See PAUL H. BERGERON, AN-
DREW JOHNSON’S CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 151–53 (2011).
186. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 982 (1868).
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resigned as Attorney General.187 In essence, Congress’s objections to
Stanbery’s decision mirror what would eventually become the stated,
if not always followed, position of future Attorneys General: That it is
not “the prerogative of the Executive . . . to exercise free and indepen-
dent judgment on constitutional questions presented by Acts of
Congress.”188
The final voice that might be expected to have weighed in on the
issue is that of the Supreme Court itself. Unfortunately, there is little
documentation available that directly addresses the Court’s opinion of
Stanbery’s refusal to appear. One clue can be seen in a letter written
to Gerrit Smith, a leading New York abolitionist,189 by Chief Justice
Chase:
Nothing is clearer to my mind than that acts of Congress not war-
ranted by the Constitution are not laws. In case a law believed by
the President to be unwarranted is passed, notwithstanding his
veto, by the required two-thirds majority, it seems to me that it is
his duty to execute it precisely as if he held it to be constitutional,
except in the case where it directly attacks and impairs the Execu-
tive power confided to him by the Constitution. In that case it
seems to me to be the clear duty of the President to disregard the
law, so far at least as it may be necessary in order to bring the ques-
tion of its constitutionality before the judicial tribunals.190
Chase appears to be taking a fairly limited view towards the pro-
priety of declining to defend acts of Congress, although tacitly endors-
ing that practice in situations where Congress’ action presents a
separation of powers problem itself. Chase presents a view of the exec-
utive’s duty to defend which closely mirrors the modern concep-
tion.191 In his letter, Chase draws the same exception to the general
rule that has become the core of modern practice, which holds that
the executive’s duty to defend statutes is abrogated only where they
infringe upon the separation of powers. In those cases, the duty can
be defied, but only insofar as is necessary to make the issue judiciable.
187. Id. at 983 (“Mr. Conness: ‘I think it would have become the Attorney General, the
day and the hour that he could not appear in behalf of the laws passed by the Congress . . .
to lay down his commission and retire to private practice.’”).
188. 4A Op. O.L.C. 55, 59 (1980).
189. See KEVIN P. S. TANNER, “A FOE TO SAD OPPRESSION’S ROD:” THE STORY OF GERRIT
SMITH 3 (2008) (describing Smith as “America’s leading political abolitionist”).
190. Letter from Chief Supreme Court Justice Salmon P. Chase to Gerrit Smith (Apr.
19, 1868), reprinted in J.W. SCHUKERS, THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF SALMON PORTLAND
CHASE 577 (1874).
191. See supra Part I.B.
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5. Subsequent Developments: The Outcome of McCardle and the
Creation of the Department of Justice
Congress managed to pass legislation removing jurisdiction from
the Court on March 12, 1868;192 three days after the oral arguments
but before the justices had met in conference. When the Court finally
met on March 21, they postponed consideration of McCardle since,
while the bill stripping jurisdiction over the pending action had been
passed by both the House and the Senate, it had not yet been ad-
dressed by the President.193 On March 25, President Johnson vetoed
the bill, warning that it “establishe[d] a precedent which, if followed,
may eventually sweep away every check on arbitrary and unconstitu-
tional legislation.”194 Both chambers overrode his veto, the Senate on
March 26195 and the House on March 27.196 Amid much contempo-
rary controversy, and over the impassioned dissent of two Supreme
Court justices, the Court set over the case until the following term.197
The next year, the Court heard additional argument on whether the
repeal act had affected the McCardle case.198 On April 12, 1869, the
Chief Justice announced the opinion of the Court: “It is quite clear . . .
that this court cannot proceed to pronounce judgment in this case,
for it has no longer jurisdiction of the appeal.” The appeal was dis-
missed for want of jurisdiction199 and the merits of the Reconstruction
Acts were never reached. The case has become highly influential for
its ultimate resolution, and a staple of Federal Courts classes nation-
wide; the legacy of McCardle is how it accentuated the tension existing
between congressional and judicial power.200
192. See Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, 15 Stat. 44 (1868) (repealing the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867 “as authorizes an appeal from the judgment of the circuit court to the Su-
preme Court of the United States, or the exercise of any such jurisdiction by said Supreme
Court on appeals which have been . . . taken”); supra note 121.
193. FAIRMAN, supra note 17, at 467–68.
194. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2094 (1868).
195. Id. at 2128.
196. Id. at 2170.
197. See FAIRMAN, supra note 17, at 475–76.
198. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 510 (1869).
199. Id. at 513.
200. See, e.g., STANLEY KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 89–113
(1968) (relating and then challenging accusations of “cowardice” and “impotence” di-
rected at the Reconstruction era Court, with reference to the McCardle case); Van Alstyne,
supra note 112, at 244–54 (discussing whether the Court should have simply ignored the
repeal act and ruled on the merits of McCardle). McCardle has also been of recent interest
in cases involving detainees in the War on Terror. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557,
657 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing McCardle for the proposition that “statutes ousting
jurisdiction terminate jurisdiction in pending cases”).
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In 1870, Congress undertook to create a Department of Jus-
tice.201 This was the culmination of several attempts to create a legal
department within the federal government. The move was, at least in
part, motivated by a desire to consolidate the government’s lawyers in
hope of achieving a more unified interpretation of the law.202 An-
other primary goal was to reduce the amount of money spent on
outside counsel.203 While some members of Congress expressed a
straightforward interest in reducing government expenditure over-
all,204 the Senate seemed less troubled by the money spent than by the
fear that it was used to hire political favorites of the official engaging
the outside counsel.205 No mention was made in either the House or
the Senate debates on that bill of the Attorney General’s refusal to
appear in McCardle. One reason for that might be that the Bill itself
predated Stanbery’s announcement, although the congressional de-
bate took place afterwards.206 Nevertheless, the unifying goal of the
Bill was clear: Congress sought to avoid situations in which the execu-
tive hired outside lawyers to represent the United States in federal
court.207
201. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (1870) (establishing the Department of
Justice).
202. See generally CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 12, at 218–25.
203. The entire Senate debate on the bill was to clarify that the purpose of the depart-
ment was to “cut off [the] extra and unnecessary expense to the [g]overnment” of employ-
ing outside counsel. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 4490 (1870).
204. See id. at 3065 (“[T]he bill is important in order to save the unnecessary expendi-
ture of more than one hundred thousand dollars annually for extra-official fees to
counsel.”).
205. Id. at 4490 (“The object of the bill is the prevention of what I may call the sporadic
system of paying fees to persons . . . who may be called department favorites.”). The wide-
spread practice of engaging outside counsel serves to further bolster Senator Hendricks’
view that the introduction of the resolution authorizing counsel in the Grant case was noth-
ing more than a political exercise to draw attention to Stanbery’s refusal to appear. See
supra note 169.
206. On December 12, 1867, a resolution instructed the Judiciary Committee to ex-
plore the consolidation of the various attorneys in the executive branch into “the Attorney
General’s department.” CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 153 (1867). Indeed, the crea-
tion of a Law Department had been in progress since an 1854 report from Attorney Gen-
eral Cushing to President Pierce. See A Report of the Attorney General Suggesting
Modifications in the Manner of Conducting the Legal Business of the Government, H.R.
EXEC. DOC. NO. 95 (1854).
207. See supra note 205. The bill’s main proponent in the House, Representative
Thomas Jenckes of Rhode Island, was concerned with ensuring that “no person should be
charged with the conduct of litigation in behalf of the United States unless he holds a
commission under the United States and is responsible to the law and the proper authori-
ties.” CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3035 (1870).
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In order to specifically deal with the problem of the Attorney
General’s ability to represent the Government effectively, the Bill pro-
posed to “create . . . a new officer, to be called the solicitor general of
the United States, part of whose duty it shall be to try these cases in
whatever courts they may arise.”208 The scope of the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s duties was quite broad. He was to be an individual “of sufficient
learning, ability, and experience that he can be sent to New Orleans
or to New York, or into any court wherever the Government has any
interest in litigation, and there present the case of the United States as
it should be presented.”209 It is not entirely clear how one additional
lawyer was intended to solve a problem that required the employment
of so many outside attorneys, since the primary effect of creating a law
department was to consolidate existing positions. If, indeed, outside
counsel was hired because the caseload was too heavy for the govern-
ment attorneys to handle, a simple reorganization would not have
solved that. However, it is clear that this new officer was meant to re-
present the United States and assume the Attorney General’s duty to
appear in the courts. It is possible Congress hoped that, by dividing
the Attorney General’s obligation to give legal opinions from the So-
licitor General’s obligation to represent the government, the problem
faced by Stanbery in McCardle could be avoided in the future. After all,
an officer whose sole job is to appear in litigation would have no occa-
sion to render official opinions on laws.210
III. Questions Raised and Lessons Learned
Stanbery’s decision not to appear in McCardle caused uproar.
Nonetheless, Stanbery’s actions serve as a guide for how to properly
make such a refusal. In both Marbury and Hudson & Goodwin, the At-
torney General’s refusal to appear effectively ended the case—or at
least barred advocacy of a particular position. This result threatened
the legal system by allowing an Attorney General’s refusal to poten-
tially usurp the roles of both the judiciary and the legislature. As a
preeminent and experienced attorney, Stanbery would certainly have
been familiar with the precedents set by Marbury and Hudson & Good-
win and, either by accident or design, took actions to ameliorate the
serious concerns those cases raised. Specifically, he announced his de-
208. Id. at 3035.
209. Id.
210. Ironically, the relationship of the Solicitor General to the President, to Congress,
and to the courts would eventually become a source of great debate as the office developed
and the federal government continued to expand. See supra note 12.
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cision publicly as well as before the Court, which provided notice to
interested parties in time to arrange an intervention, and took steps to
ensure that the law would be defended by able counsel before he per-
sonally withdrew.211 By these actions, Stanbery demonstrated the best
possible mechanism for an Attorney General to permissibly decline to
defend certain statutes.
While McCardle presents the issue of an Attorney General’s ability
to refuse to defend an act of Congress in its purest form, it also artifi-
cially exaggerates the problem. At the time of Stanbery’s decision, the
Attorney General’s office consisted of only Stanbery himself, two non-
lawyer assistants, and a clerical staff.212 Thus, the decision of the Attor-
ney General necessarily became the decision of the entire depart-
ment. This characteristic makes it easy to conflate the professional
decision made by Henry Stanbery as an attorney with that made by the
Office of the Attorney General. In the present era, with the Depart-
ment of Justice heralding itself as the “world’s largest law office,”213
decisions made by the department not to appear are more pro-
nounced as those decisions can no longer arise simply out of the con-
flict existing between the official position and the legal opinion of a
single attorney. Most discussion of Stanbery’s decision has focused on
whether he, as Attorney General, should have been compelled to
make an argument in defense of a statute that he and the President
believed to be unconstitutional. The starting point for analyzing that
issue is to answer the question: who was Stanbery’s client? While the
Attorney General has a statutory responsibility to appear on behalf of
the United States, the scope of that obligation depends on whether
one views that duty as being owed primarily to the President, to the
Congress, or as one former Attorney General believed, simply to the
country.214 If the Attorney General is viewed first as the attorney for
the executive branch, then he would be well within his professional
rights to decline to make an argument or to pursue a case at the be-
hest of the President. If, however, the Attorney General’s primary cli-
ent is Congress, the drafters of the statute at issue, or the United
States in general, then the scope of his duty to defend becomes less
clear. In that case, his duty to his client can become outright contra-
dictory as he seeks to balance competing interests.
211. See supra Parts II.A, II.B.3.
212. CUMMINGS & MACFARLAND, supra note 12, at 223.
213. See About the Office, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF ATT’Y RECRUITMENT MGMT.
(Aug. 2011), http://www.justice.gov/oarm/about-office.html (“The Department of Justice
is the world’s largest law office, employing more than 10,000 attorneys nationwide.”).
214. FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 98 (1962).
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Stanbury faced an ethical dilemma. First, all clients have “a right
to have [their] case decided upon the law and . . . to have every view
presented to the minds of the judges which can legitimately bear
upon the question.”215 For Stanbery, however, this duty contrasted
against the equally well-accepted principle that an attorney must not
misstate the law to the court.216 Stanbery believed the Acts were un-
constitutional, and to declare otherwise before the Court might seem
dishonest. On the other hand, it is a clear dereliction of duty for an
attorney to abdicate a client’s position simply because he thinks that
he will not, or even should not, prevail. From this perspective,
Stanbery’s dilemma raises the question, perhaps irresolvable, of what
action a lawyer should take when faced with the duty to defend a law
that he believes, in his professional opinion, is unconstitutional. On
the one hand, “the lawyer who refuses his professional assistance be-
cause in his judgment the case is unjust and indefensible usurps the
[function] of [the] judge.”217 On the other hand, the Attorney Gen-
eral is not a normal attorney presented with a case in which he doubts
the merits of his client’s position. As counsel to the United States, his
position carries with it an additional level of credibility and perhaps a
heightened privilege of independent review, such that his decision to
decline to adopt a certain position should perhaps be scrutinized dif-
ferently than that of a private attorney.
Stanbery’s position in McCardle was particularly ethically precari-
ous. He not only believed that the Reconstruction Acts were unconsti-
tutional, but had also given public opinions to that effect. Stanbery’s
situation is analogous to that of an attorney who, in his professional
writings, takes a strong position on a timely legal issue. If subsequently
asked by a client to argue the other side in some pending legal matter,
could that hypothetical lawyer properly do so?218 Could he realistically
fulfill his duty to provide competent representation to the client while
arguing a legal position he has already convinced himself is incorrect?
These questions cannot be answered in the space allotted, yet surely
215. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 83 (5th ed.1907).
216. See GEORGE W. WARVELLE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS 195–96 (Callaghan & Co. 1920)
(“It is one of the ancient duties of counsel to advise the court with respect to the law of the
particular case in which he appears. . . . In discharge of this duty counsel is required exer-
cise the utmost candor . . . .”). This principle remains in effect today. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (“A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law
to a tribunal . . . .”).
217. SHARSWOOD, supra note 215, at 83.
218. The danger, as raised by Reverdy Johnson, is that the attorney’s credibility and
effectiveness before the court would be so threatened by the apparent inconsistency that
he must be forced to withdraw as counsel. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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bear on any assessment of Stanbery’s decision to withdraw from the
McCardle case. A separate question asks whether, even if Stanbery was
ethically correct in refusing to appear, the more appropriate course of
action would have been for him to resign his office? After all, that
would seem the usual and expected course of conduct for a private
attorney unable to provide effective representation to a client for
whatever reason.
The more significant concerns raised by an Attorney General’s
refusal to defend an act of Congress relate to the integrity of the ad-
versarial process and to the preservation of the system of checks and
balances. The adversarial system is the “hallmark of American adjudi-
cation.”219 It is thought to enhance the quality of the resulting deter-
minations by assuring that competing positions are fully and
vigorously advanced. That no one appeared on behalf of Madison in
Marbury created a situation in which Marbury’s attorney conducted
the entire trial opposed by nothing but the questioning of the Justices
themselves. Potential repercussions caused by this lack of a true adver-
sary in Marbury were ameliorated, perhaps, by the fact that the execu-
tive clearly opposed Marbury’s application for a writ. As that case
involved a challenge to executive power, the refusal to appear worked,
essentially, as the executive’s consent to a trial in absentia. In contrast
to fully adversary proceedings, however, such consent does nothing to
assure that the issues are fully explored or that relevant arguments are
presented and tested.
The situation was worse in Hudson & Goodwin. Of all the cases
discussed here, the actions of the Attorney General in Hudson & Good-
win posed the greatest risk to the legal system. Even though Attorney
General Pinkney, too, simply refused to argue a position that he be-
lieved was incorrect, that decision effectively prevented any resolution
of the issues presented. By not appearing, Pinkney eliminated the con-
troversy from the case: the defendant believed the case should be dis-
missed and the government refused to argue otherwise. Similarly, in
Coolidge, the Attorney General prevented the issue from being heard
at all, simply by refusing to appear. There seems a clear danger in
allowing an Attorney General’s decision not to appear to preclude ju-
dicial review.
219. Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J.
301, 301 (1989); see also Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911) (“[The] judicial
power . . . is the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants,
duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction.”) (emphasis added)).
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Any system that allows the Attorney General to refuse to argue in
defense of an act of Congress necessitates an alternative mechanism
by which some party would have standing to defend the statute. Tradi-
tionally, Congress lacked its own legal staff able to intervene in cases
and relied on the Attorney General to represent its legal interests.220
In cases where the Attorney General refused to appear, such as McCar-
dle, or where the Attorney General argued against the controlling stat-
ute, such as Myers, members of Congress were forced to appear in
their personal capacities to argue the cases. In McCardle, for example,
the War Department made arrangements to hire two sitting sena-
tors.221 In Myers, Senator Pepper appeared at the request of the Court
as amicus curiae.222
This state of affairs changed in 1978 with the establishment of the
Senate Legal Counsel, which was given responsibility to intervene “in
any legal action or proceeding . . . in which the powers and responsi-
bilities of Congress under the Constitution of the United States are
placed in issue.”223 This change addressed the Myers and Chadha man-
ner of cases that directly implicate powers of Congress in relation to
the powers of the President. However, the Senate Legal Counsel was
also given the duty to “defend vigorously when placed in issue— . . .
the constitutionality of Acts of Congress.”224 Together, these arrange-
ments allow for Congress to better defend its interests and, in a sense,
place the Attorney General more fully within the executive branch.
Any overlapping duties, such as the provision of legal opinions, are
now dealt with by the appropriate congressional office. However, we
may someday find ourselves discussing some of these same issues in
the context of a refusal by a Senate Legal Counsel to defend a statute
that he considers to be unconstitutional.
Conclusion
Despite protestations to the contrary, Attorneys General have re-
fused to argue the position of “the United States” before the Supreme
Court dating back to the country’s founding. Those refusals have im-
plicated concerns regarding the separation of powers, the nature of
220. See REBECCA SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 87 (1992).
221. See supra Part II.B.3.
222. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926).
223. 2 U.S.C. § 288e(a) (2006).
224. Id. § 288h(7). The Speaker of the House’s legal counsel has been given similar
duties, albeit through the House’s internal rules. Days, supra note 12, at 502.
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the legal process, and even the personal duties of an attorney to his
client.
There are two widely recognized situations in which the Attorney
General need not, and perhaps should not, defend an act of Congress
against a constitutional challenge.
The first applies where a statute infringes upon the powers consti-
tutionally granted to the executive. This exception recognizes the fun-
damental reality that “the government” is not a monolithic entity with
a single voice, but rather a collection of co-equal branches, and
subordinate departments, who will, at times, find themselves in con-
flict. Permitting the Attorney General to refuse to defend, or to ac-
tively oppose, a statute in this context, merely acknowledges this fact.
It acknowledges that “the United States” might not, actually, consti-
tute a single party to a proceeding and it recognizes the Attorney Gen-
eral’s traditional role as a member of the executive branch.
The second exception, forgiving the duty where no credible argu-
ment can be made in defense of a statute, is similarly straightforward.
It shows respect for the power of precedential decisions while ac-
knowledging the finite resources of the court system by recognizing
that if a statute is very similar to one that has been struck down, it is
often not a productive use of governmental resources to defend it. In
practice, however, there can be strong differences of opinion as to
whether credible arguments exist.
Of course, there is still a third category governing situations in
which the President believes a statute to be unconstitutional before,
or even in spite of, a court’s ruling. This Article has sought to explore
some of the earliest and most significant cases concerning that cate-
gory. At its narrowest, this Article contends any claim that the refusal
to defend is a recent development is historically false. More broadly,
this Article has drawn out the historical debate surrounding Attorney
General Stanbery’s decision not to appear in Ex Parte McCardle—a de-
bate which closely mirrors debates had over similar decisions today—
and attempted to identify the potential issues presented by the prac-
tice. By examining these early cases, this Article attempted to present
a wide range of potential situations in which the Attorney General
might decline to appear.
Beyond any professional issues raised by the withdrawal of coun-
sel, the most important considerations in analyzing an Attorney Gen-
eral’s decision not to appear are the maintenance of the adversarial
system and ensuring the effective separation of powers with checks
and balances. Interested parties must be allowed to defend their inter-
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ests, even where the customary party chooses not to. Stanbery’s efforts
to make sure that the War Department engaged counsel in McCardle,
as well as the subsequent creation of legal offices within the Congress
to handle such suits, did much to alleviate the dangers posed by
Stanbery’s decision, and provides an important lesson for analyzing
similar situations today. While the decision not to defend a statute
inevitably invites controversy and criticism, an Attorney General does
much to maintain the dignity of his office by taking steps to provide
for the vigorous defense of acts of Congress. Whatever the merits of
such a decision, those decisions are well-precedented and, provided
that some process is available through which to provide the act with a
legal defense, the decision not to defend an act does not pose a sub-
stantial risk to our system of government.
688 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
